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The Supply and Condition of Equipment
STOCK OF VEHICLES POORLY OR INVERSELY RELATED TO TRAFFIC
The preceding two chapters show that the number of cars and
locomotives with which the railroads handle their business did
not increase as much as traffic when the latter was growing or
decline as much when it was diminishing. They tell nothing, how-
ever, about the direction of change in the size of the equipment
stock itself. In expansions the stock may, for all we have yet
said, have increased (although not in proportion to traffic) or may
have decreased. In contractions it may have been reduced (al-
though not proportionately) or augmented.
As a matter of fact the stock sometimes became larger and
sometimes smaller in expansion, and likewise in contraction. Up
to the first World War, the railroads made net additions to their
supply of every kind of equipment for which we have information
in phases of rising and in those of falling traffic alike (Table 33).
Beginning in the early or middle 1920's (depending on the type
of vehicle) stocks of every variety diminished in phases of both
kinds. In the intermediate period (marked off by horizontal lines
in the table) most of our observations for locomotives and freight
cars indicate increases in stocks, regardless of phase; but two
show falls in expansions, and two in contractions of traffic. (The
number of passenger cars was reduced in all rising phases of travel
except one, augmented in all the falling phases.)
Even when allowance is made for changes in the rate of growth
or decline as well as for direction of change, the number of vehicles
does not appear to have conformed positively to the fluctuations
in traffic (Table 34). In the case of total stocks, instances counting
toward an inverse are more numerous than those counting toward
a positive relation, on the whole. For freight locomotives before
the war,however,the margin is very close; aiid for freight cars
afterward the data suggest positive conformity by a fair pre-
ponderance. In the case of serviceable stocks margins are so nar-





Change in Stocks of Locomotives and Cars during Cycles
and Passenger-miles
Direction of change from preceding date
What data we have on capacity rather than number do not
suggest that the aggregate load-carrying ability of freight cars
varies directly with ton-miles: 13 comparisons score inverse, only
4 positive conformity (Table 41). Between 1921 and 1938 the
aggregate number of seats in passenger cars was inversely related
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aForexactdates and annual or monthly nature of figuresseetables
bNocorresponding phases. 0FromSUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 139
tractive effort of locomotives are not adequately subdivided by
services.)
Table 34
Number of Comparisons suggesting Positive, and Number suggesting
Inverse, Conformity of Equipment Stocks to Cycles in Ton-miles or
Passenger-miles
All vehicles Serviceable vehicles




Freight Locomotives1893—1914 3 4 ...... 35
Freight Locomotives1921—38 1 7 4 4 36
Freight Cars 1876—1921 6 10 . .. 37
Freight Cars 1920—38 6 2 5 3 36
PassengerLocomotives1908—13 0 2 .. .. 38
PassengerLocomotives1922—38 1 6 4 3 39
Passenger Cars 1908—38 1 12 tO
Table 35
Freight Locomotives: Change per Year between End-quarter Peaks and
Troughs in Ton-miles, 1893—1914 -_________
Changefrom preceding date
T ears Per year ye 0 from No. of
________________




1893 Peak ... 19,603
1894Trough 1 20,090 397... 397
1903 Peak 9 25,444 5,444 605 ... Positive
1904 Trough 1 27.029 1,585... 1,585Inverse
1907 Peak 3 32,079 5,050 1,683 ... Positive
1908 Trough 1 33,840 1,761 ... 1,761 Inverse
1908 Trough .. 33,655
1910 Peak 2 1 p337 668
1911 Trough 1 36,405 1,413 ... 1,413Inverse
1913 Peak 2 38,493d 2,0881,044... Inverse
1914 Trough 1 39,333d 840... 840Positive
aQuarterended June 30. Level in other than end-quarters ignored in determining
30.
Bycomparison with preceding rate, e.g., 605 with 397.
d Class I plus lipius III railways assumed to bear same ratio to I plus II as in 1912Table 36
Number of Locomotives assigned to Road Freight Service, and Number of Freight Cars on Line




All vehicles Serviceable vehicles
Numbers
















































































































































































... 2,322... ... ...
... 2,084 —238... —14.0
Positive 2,248 164 7.8...
Positive 2,295 47... 3.4
Positive 2,365 70 2.8...
Positive 2,348 —17... —1.0
Positive 2,325 —23—1.2 ...
Positive 2,109 —216 ... —6.2
Inverse 1,768 —341 —6.0 ...











a Three-monthaverage; date of turn is middle month.
bNotknown, because certain roads failed to report; but even with these included, figure would be lower than that for July 1921;
see Charts 69 and 70.SUPPLY AND CONDITION
Table 37
OP EQUIPMENT 141
Freight Train-cars: Change per Year between
Troughs in Ton-miles, 1876—1921
End-quarter Peaks and
b Onlast day of quarter.
(thousands of cars)
By comparison with preceding rate; e.g., 58 with 7.
Table 38
Passenger Locomotives: Change per Year between End-quarter Peaks
Level of passenger-miles,
June
Years from preceding date




To peak from trough
To trough from peak
Level in other than end-quarters ignored.
b ClassIplus II plus II! assumed to bear same ratio to Class I plus II as in 1912.






















































































































































a Quarterended June 30, 1876—1914; December 31, 1918—21
ignored.
Level in other quarters
and Troughsin Passenger-miles, 1908—1913






Number of Locomotives assigned to Road Passenger Service





































































































































'Three-month average; date of turn is middle month.
bBycomparison with preceding rate; e.g., 0 with —33 or 3 with 1.SUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 143
Table 40
Passenger-carrying Cars: Change per Year between End-quarter Peaks
and Troughs in Passenger-miles, 1908—1938
Change from preceding date
Passenger- Per year
Level of carrying
end-quartersears carsb Total To To




1908 Trough ... 31,278°
1910 Peak 2 32,702° 1,424 712
1911 Trough 1 34,233° 1,531
1910 Peak ... 37,908"
1911 Trough 1 4O,081d 2,173 ... 2,173
1913 Peak 2 42,278" 2,197 1,098
1911 Trough ... 37,676
1913 Peak 2 39,815 2,139 1,070
1915 Trough 2 42,003 2,188 ... 1,094
1917 Peak 2.5 41,589 —414 —166
1918 Trough 1 41,922 333 ... 333
1919 Peak 1 41,699 —223 —223
1921 Trough 2 41,838 139 ... 70
1923 Peak 2 41,509 —329 —164
1924 Trough 1 41,719 210 ...
1 41,821 102 102
1932 Trough 7 37,059 4,762 ... 680
1937 Peak 5 29,678 —7,381 —1,476
1938 Trough 1 28,791 —887 ... 887
aQuarterended June 30, 1908—15; December 31, 1917—38. Level in other quarters
ignored.
b On last day of quarter. Class I line-haul roads plus Pullman Co., except as noted.
All line-haul roads, only.
d All line-haul roads plus Pullman Co.
Changes in a stock of equipment are the net result of two proc-
esses—installation and retirement.' If installations during a phase
'Installations include, among other subdivisions, "Used units acquired", "Leased
from. others—used units". These categories
may represent to some degree transfers among Class I railways rather than addi-
tions to the supply available to them as a class. Retirements included "Leased to
others" and "Returned to lessors—not known to have been permanently with-
drawn for sale or demolition", which may represent transfers rather than group
PT C
notbe real gains andlosses. off;eight cars, howe;er, reclassifications
appear to be largely shifts to and from "company service equipment", i.e., real
additions to and deletions from the freight fleet.Subdivisions of the installation
and retirement figures have been published for 1932 and subsequent years. For
freight cars they suggest that the dubious categories are unimportant. "New144 CHAPTER 6
Table 41
Aggregate Capacity of Railway-owned Freight Cars
Change per Year between Peaks and Troughs in End-quarter Ton-miles,
1903—1938
Change from preceding date
Total Per year
Level of Years Conformity
from capacity To To suggested by
thnnhlesa prec. peak troughcomparison with
date from from prec. rate
trough peak
(millions of tons)
1903 Peak ... 48.6 ...
1904 Trough 1 50.9 2.3.... 2.3
1907 Peak 3 67.3 16.4 5.5... Positive
1908 Trough 1 73.3 .6.0... 6.0 Inverse
1910 Peak 2 77.1 3.8 1.9... Inverse
1911 Trough 1 81.5 4.4... 4.4 Inverse
1913 Peak 2 88.0 6.5 3.2... Inverse
1914 Trough 1 91.9 3.9 3.9 Inverse
1914 Trough ... 88.8°... ...
1918 Peak 4.5 96.8 8.0 1.8
1919 Trough 1 09.0 2.2... 2.2 Inverse
1920 Peak 1 98.3 —0.7—0.7... Inverse
1921 Trough 1 98.5 0.2... 0.2 Inverse
1922 Peak 1 98.8 0.30.3... Positive
1923 Trough 1 101.3 2.5... 2.5 Inverse
1926 Peak 3 106.0 4.7 1.6... Inverse
1927 Trough 1 105.8 —0.2... —0.2 Positive
1928 Peak 1 105.3 —0.5—0.5 . . Inverse
1932 Trough 4 100.9 —4.4 .... —1.1 Positive
1936 Peak 4 85.7 —15.2—3.8... Inverse
1938 Trough 2 84.0 —1.7... —0.8 Inverse
aQuarterended June 30, 1903—14; December 31, 1918—38. Level in other quarters
ignored.
bOnlast day of quarter. All railways, 1903—14; Class I line-haul railways, 1914—38.
Figure for all roads, 1914, multiplied by 1915 ratio, .966, of Class I to all.
are higher than retirements the stock will increase; if they are
lower it will decline. If average monthly (or annual) installations
exceed average monthly (or annual) retirements by a wide margin,
the stock will increase more rapidly than if there is only a narrow
excess. If they fall short of average retirements by a wide margin,
units acquired" and "Rebuilt and re-written into property accounts" include a
great majority of installations, "Permanently withdrawn for sale or demolition"
and "Retired for purpose of rebuilding" a great majority of retirements.
Chiefly because of changes in the list of Class I carriers, the net balance of in-









Aggregate Seating Capacity of Passenger Cars (thousands of seats)
Change per Year between Peaks and Troughs in End-quarter Passenger-miles, 1921—1938
Date 1921 1923 1924 1925 1932 1937 1938 1932 1937 1938
Level of end-quarter passenger
miles
TroughPeakTroughPeakTroughPeakTroughTroughPeakTrough
Years from preceding date ... 2 1 1 7 5 1 5 1
Aggregate 2,184 2,213 2,227 2,198 1,965 1,583 1,543 2,208 1,782 1,739
Change from preceding (late
Total
Per year
To peak from trough
























Conformity suggested' ... ... NoneInversePositiveInverseInverse .. .. Inverse
Class I line-haul railways only, 1921—38 section.Same plus Pullman Co., 1932—38 section. Prior to 1935 railway-owned sleeping
cars were counted as having a capacity of two persons per seat or berth; beginning in 1935 only one. We deducted one-half the rail-
way-owned sleeping car capacity from the Statistics of Railways figures before 1935.
bBycomparison with preceding rate; e.g., 14 with 14.Table 43
Freight-train Cars Installed and Retired per Year between End-quarter Peaks and Troughs in Ton-miles, 1907—1938
Number of cars installed Number of cars retired
ID
of Years from Per year Conformity Per year Conformity a C prec. dateTotal since suggested' Total since suggested°
prec. date In prec. date In In
expansioncontraction expansioncontraction
1907 Peak
1908 Trough 1 171,556 ... 171,556 ... 70,976 ... 70,976
1910 Peak 2 202,518 101,259 ... Inverse 158,875 79,438 Inverse
1911 Trough 1 125,532 ... 125,532 Inverse 68,031 ... 68,031 Inverse
1913 Peak 2 260,642 130,321 ... Positive 166,701 83,350 .. Inverse
1914 Trough 1 150,813 ... 150,813 Inverse 96,985 ... 96,985 Positive
1918 Peak 4d 356,725" 89,181 Inverse 318,620" 79,655 .. Positive
1919 Trough 1 76,019 ... 76,019 Positive 43,274 ... 43,274 Inverse
1920 Peak 1 36,044 36,044 ... Inverse 75,197 75,197 ... Inverse
1921 Trough 1 63,406 ... 63,406 Inverse 69,245 ... 69,245 Inverse
1922 Peak 1 105,394 105,394 .. Positive 126,471 126,471 Inverse
1923 Trough 1 232,060 ... 232,060 Inverse 213,789 ... 213,789 Positive
1926 Peak 3 389,024 129,675 ... Inverse 350,315 116,772 ... Positive
1927 Trough 1 73,254 ... 73,254 Positive 96,991 ... 96,991 Inverse
1928 Peak 1 62,945 62,945 ... Inverse 90,707 90,707 .. Positive
1932 Trough 4 199,439 ... 49,860 Positive 350,192 87,548 Inverse
1936 Peak 4 132,251 33,063 ... Inverse 500,394125,098 ... Inverse
1938 Trough 2 116,849 ... 58,424 Inverse 175,559 87,780 Inverse
a Year ended June 30, 1907—14; December 31, 1918—38.
b Level in other quarters ignored.
By comparison with preceding date; e.g., 101,259 with 171,556 or 79,438 with 70,976. The 'conformity suggested' is that which eachc
comparison of figures suggests would have occurred in the stock of freight cars. For example, since installations were more frequent
in 1907—08 than in 1908—10, they tended to build up stock more rapidly in the contraction than in the expansion; i.e., to cause in-
verse conformity of stock. Since retirements were less frequent in 1907—OS than in 1908—10, they tended to pull down the stock less
rapidly in the contraction than in the expansion; i.e., they too, in this instance, tended to cause inverse conformity.
d No data for June 30 to December 31, 1916 available; hence 4 years instead of 4.5 used as divisor.Table 44
Passenger4rain Cars Installed and Retired per Year between End-quarter Peaks and Troughs in Passenger-miles,
Number of cars installed Number of cars retired
Level of Z
Dateapai-enger-miles, Years from Per year Conformity Per year Conformity
c%ledprec. dateTotal since suggested Total since suggested'
jna e prec. date In prec. date In In
expansioncontraction expansioncontraction
1908 Trough 0
1910 Peak 2 5,291 2,646 ... 3,505 1,752 ... ..
1911 Trough 1 4,250 .. 4,250 Inverse 1,701 ... 1,701 Inverse b'i
1913 Peak 2 5,883 2,942 ... Inverse 3,229 1,614 ... Positive
1915 Trough 2 6,293 ... 3,146 Inverse 3,239 ... 1,620 Positive
1917 Peak 2" 3,796" 1,898 ... Inverse 1,914 ... Inverse
1918 Trough 1 1,817 ... 1,817 Positive 1,051 ... 1,051 Inverse
1919 Peak 1 435 435 ... Inverse 670 670 Positive
1921 Trough 2 2302 ... 1,151 Inverse 1,814 ... 907 Positive
1923 Peak 2 3,986 1,993 ... Positive 3,646 1,823 ... Inverse
1924 Trough 1 2,755 .. 2,755 Inverse 2,295 ... 2,295 Positive
1925 Peak 1 3,230 3,230 ... Positive 3,569 3,569 ... Inverse
1932 Trough 7 14,464 ... 2,066 Positive 19,574 ... 2,796 Inverse
1937 Peak 5 4,237 847 ... Inverse 12,904 2,581 ... Positive
1938 Trough 1 642 .. 642 Positive 1,592 ... 1,592 Inverse
aYearended June 30, 11)08—15; December 31, 1917—38.
bLevelin ther quartert ignored.
By compstiison with preceding rate; e.g., 4,250 with 2,646 or 1,701 with 1,752. For the special meaning of positive or inverse con-
formity herr, which may seem puzzling in the column for retirements, see note c to Table 43.
d No data fr June 30 to December 31, 1916 available, hence 2 years instead of 2.5 used as divisor.148 CHAPTER 6
the stock will decline more rapidly than if the deficiency is small.
We may analyze separately the effect of each upon the conformity
of the stock. If the average rate of installation is higher in expan-
sion than in contraction, for example, the stock must conform
positively, provided the rate of retirement is the same in both
phases. If the average rate of retirement is higher in expansion
than in contraction, the stock must conform inversely, provided
installations proceed at the same rate in both.
In fact, neither corresponded very closely to fluctuations in
traffic. More often than not, installations of freight cars pro-
ceeded more rapidly in contractions than in expansions of ton-
miles. Eleven comparisons of adjoining phases indicate greater
annual gross additions to car supply when the movement of
freight was diminishing than when it was increasing. Five indicate
the contrary (Table 43). In most cases installations tended to
produce inverse conformity of car stocks. Retirements, on the
other hand, were, if anything, more.frequent in expansion. Eleven
comparisons indicate more rapid gross reductions in expansion
than in contraction; only 5 indicate the reverse. Retirements,
like installations, tended to produce inverse conformity of stocks.
Neither majority, however, is very impressive.
Installations and retirements of passenger-train cars were even
less consistently responsive to cyclical variations in traffic than
those of freight cars (Table 44) •2In5 comparisons, cars were
added to supply more rapidly when travel was gaining; but in 8,
additions were more frequent in contraction. Retirements pro-
ceeded faster in expansion in 7 pairs of phases, but slower in
POSITIVE RELATION OVER LONG PERIODS
Although the size of stocks bore little relation to cyclical fluctua-
tions in traffic, the history of the two looks similar when viewed in
longer perspective. The era during which ton-miles and passenger-
miles in each expansion usually rose well above the previous peak
2Thefigures, however, are not nearly as satisfactory. They include non-passenger-
carrying cars and do not include Pullmans. "Used units acquired", lease items and
reclassifications between passenger-train categories seem to be important, at
least in some years.
8Dataon installations and retirements of locomotives are not subdivided by serv-
ices.CHART 63
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Shaded periods are contractions in end-quarter passenger-miles
(not available before 1908, which, however was a trough).
149CHART 66















Shaded periods are contractions in revenue ton—miles.
1920 figures do not include: New York Central, February-December; Missouri Pacific, February, Marth;
Fort Smith and Western, March.
150SUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 151
level was one of rather steadily increasing supplies of cars and
locomotives (Charts 63, 64, and 65). The period in which each
high point little exceeded or did not even equal its predecessor
was one of persistently diminishing stocks (Charts 66, 67, 68, and
64)Itis true that the transition was somewhat more diffused in
the case of equipment. We can place the critical point in traffic
fairly well at 1920. But there were minor choppy waves in
stocks, with little net change, from about 1914 to the middle
1920's, generally speaking. Wartime difficulties may account for
the early disappearance of rapid growth. After the war perhaps
the railroads tried to eliminate the long-standing problem of car
shortages. Such an endeavor would explain the belated downturn
in stocks; and car shortages did become negligible after 1924
(they reappeared in World War II).
CHART 67
Data in Charts 66—68 and 72—74 are daily averages through January 1935,averages
of beginning and end of month thereafter. Class I switching and terminalcom-
panies included 1937 and thereafter.
Serviceable Locomotives Assigned to Road Freight Service; Total and Service-




Shaded periods are contractions in revenue ton-miles.
Locomotive data incomplete in 1920. See Chart 66.152 CHAPTER 6
CHART68









Shaded periods are contraclions in passenger-miles.-
Inthe middle 1890's, when the sharp cumulative growth of
traffic from cycle to cycle was temporarily interrupted, the situa-
tion was rather like that which prevailed after the early 1920's.
The 1896 peak in ton-miles was only slightly higher than the one
in 1893 according to annual data, lower according to monthly
estimates. Annual figures indicate that the later high point in
passenger-miles was lower than the earlier. The curve of freight
car stocks is quite fiat for several years after the sharp rise in
1893—94. Passenger equipment diminished or increased little in
most years, 1893—99. The supply of locomotives in all services
combined grew at a conspicuously retarded rate during about the
same period.
CAR BUYING AND THE GROWTH OF TRAFFIC
More frequent orders in expansion
Reverting to the shorter, cyclical periods of rising and those of
falling traffic, we find that railroad managers did make a greaterSUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 153
effort to build up their stock of equipment in the former than in
the latter. In 20 of 27 pairs of neighboring phases in ton-miles,
freight car orders per quarter were higher in expansion than in
contraction (Table 45). Some of the exceptions, moreover, oc-
curred under rather peculiar circumstances. Purchases in 1915—18
averaged slightly lower than in 1913—14. But the imminence of
federal control in 1917 may have discouraged the roads from
buying equipment. By the end of that year, moreover, cars were
hard to get. "Car and locomotive builders are largely engaged in
producing equipment needed abroad, both by our allies and our
own forces. ..", theICC reported on December 1. "The steel
and other materials needed for such construction, as well as the
labor, are also needed in other phases of the conffiet."5 Railway
profits took an unusually unfavorable turn toward the end of
private operation (Oh. 10). Even the mammoth order placed by
the Director-General in the very last quarter of the traffic ex-
pansion would not necessarily offset the effect of these influences.
Quarterly, average orders were substantially lower in the brief
expansion of 1919—20 than in 1920—21. Here the situation as to
control was reversed: the Director-General, faced with the pros-
pect that the railroads would soon be given back to their owners,
was unwilling to buy more equipment.6 Purchases were made in
1929—32 at a higher average rate than in either the preceding or
the following expansion. In this case, however, our system of
marking off phases may be at fault. Ton-miles were greater in the
last quarter of 1928 than in subsequent quarters; accordingly we
took that quarter as the end of the expansion. But the first three
quarters of 1929 were almost as high and even the fourth not much
lower. The rapid decline began in 1930. Successive figures, begin-
fling with the fourth quarter of 1928, in billions of ton-miles, are
113.93; 112.02; 113.54; 113.52; 108.04. Orders were much higher
1090 T2
0
1929to the expansion, we get averages of 17,501 cars per quarter
for I 28—Ill 29 inclusive and oniy 7,141 for IV 29—Ill 32. The
new figure for the expansion is higher not only than that for the
but also tna.n tIne ngure br 19'26—21, Three
of our 7 exceptions are eliminated by this re-dating. Altogether,
5 are somewhat questionable.
47 ICC 757, 759.
6Hines,War History. .., p.125.154 CHAPTER 6
Table 45




Number of cars ordered





I 77 II 77 2 5,080 2,540
III77 II 84 28 316,820 11,315
III 84 III 85 5 26,890 ... 5,378
1EV85 II 93 31 542,370 17,496
III93 III 94 5 29,720 ... 5,944
TV 94 I 96 6 97,630 16,272
II 96 III 96 2 25,680 ... 12,840
IV96 II 03 27 930,870 34,477
III 03 I 04 3 43,030 ... 14,343
II04 II 07 13 787,080 60,545
III 07 II 08 4 34,530 ... 8,632
III08 I 10 7 235,220 33,603
II 10 Iii 4 72,440 18,110
II 11 II 13 9 323,660 35,962
III 13 IV 14 6 161,960 ... 26,993
I 15 II 18 14 365,230 26,088
111 18 II 19 4 1,000 ... 250
III 19 I 20 3 14,640 4,880
II 20 III 21 6 57,470 ... 9,578
IV 21 II 23 7 244,250 34,893
III 23 II 24 4 93,350 ... 23,338
III 24 III 26 9 193,240 21,471
11124 11126 9 217,430 24,159
IV 26 IV 27 5 76,300 ... 15,260
I 28 IV 28 4 42,880 10,720
I 29 III 32 15 165,320 ... 11,021
IV 32 II 37 19 164,640 8,665
III 37 II 38 4 17,240 ... 4,310
aFirstafter trough in expansion, after peak in contraction.
b1877—1926from Railroad Purchasing and the Business Cycle, John E. Partington
(Brookings Institution, 1929), pp. 219—26; 1924—38 from the Iron Trade Review.
NBER seasonal adjustment made to nearest 10 cars.
In 12 of 15 pairs of phases in travel, passenger car orders per
quarter were higher when traffic was gaining than when it was
declining (Table 46). One of the three exceptions involved the
brief (one quarter long) expansion of 1928—29 and one the war
phase 1914—18. But orders were also more frequent in the long
contraction of 1929—33 than in the long rise of 1933—37.
The time consumed in construction, we infer, prevented these
differences in rates of ordering from being reflected in rates of





7 3,319 ... 474
7 4,075 582
4 1,009 ... 252
14 3,496 250
2 0 ... 0
7 1,101 157
6 582 •.. 97
7 3,752 536
6 2,951 ... 492
1 574 574
1 489 489
13 4,996 ... 384
1 120 120
16 1,701 ... 106
16 1,021 64
6 265 ... 44
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Table 46
Passenger-cars Ordered per Quarter during Phases of Passenger-miles,
1908—1938
Quarters included Number of cars ordered
FirstS Last










III 25 III 25





II 37 III 38
a First after trough in expansion, after peak in contraction.
b1908—25from Partington; 1925—38 from Railway Age.
Purchases often declined before traffic
The curve of freight car orders contains many wild fluctuations
(Chart 69). The business cycle staff of the National Bureau recog-
nizes many more peaks and troughs in orders than in traffic.
On Chart 69 we indicate them, as usual, by asterisks. For every
peak in ton-miles, however, we can pick out one supremely high
quarter in orders; we encircle its asterisk. (In doing so, we dis-
regard the needle-like rise in the second quarter of 1918, when,
because of government action, orders shot up from practically
nothing to 100,000 cars, then relapsed to absolutely nothing.
Instead we choose an earlier peak more like those usually encoun-
7 In every instance except two (1920 and 1929) the high
point in orders preceded the peak of traffic—sometimes by a long
interval.
During the first six expansions of travel, orders for passenger
The propriety of calling the 1918 needle-point a peak is discussed in Measuring
Business Cycles, p. 492.CHART 69
C;' Freight Car Orders, First Quarter 1870—Fourth Quarter 1939
Thousandcars Thousand cars
0
Shadedperiods are contractions in ton-miles.SUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 157
cars likewise declined before passenger-miles reached their climax
(Chart 70). The early recession of purchases in 1914—18 may be
attributable to war conditions, but that in 1920—21 cannot be ex-
plained by anticipation of return to private operation, for the
transfer of control was made before the decline in orders. Since the
seventh and eighth expansion each lasted only one quarter, orders
could not reach a peak within either. Supreme high and low points
in orders are indeed hard to select after 1923, and we have not
tried. But certainly there was no peak of purchases at the initial
trough of traffic in either expansion. In the 1933—37 phase the high
points in orders and traffic coincided, although a subsidiary rise
in purchases reached almost as high a level in 1934.
CHART 70










1907'09 '11 '13 '15 '11
Shaded periods are contractions in passenger—miles.
JohnMaurice Clark has suggested that the earliness of the decline
iii orders may be a to i'etarciation in the growth of traf-
fic.8 When railway business increases, his argument runs, more
equipment is needed to handle it, and more is ordered. When it
increases rapidly orders must he frequent If, although it continues
8See'Business Acceleration and the Law of Demand', reprinted from the Journal
of Politica' Economy, March 1917, in his Preface to Socia' Economics (Farrar and
Rinehart, 1936) and his further discussion cited on p. 349 of the latter volume.
Rate of traffic growth does not explain early peaks in orders158 CHAPTER 6
Table 47
Increase per Quarter in Ton-miles; Freight Cars Ordered per Quarter
During Segments of Expansions in
Increase in ton-miles
Ton-miles
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Table 47—Concluded





Expansion BillionDirection Thousands1 Direction betsyeenThousands Direction between
and segmentaton-miles of change per of change per of change
perfrom prec.quarter°from prec.'/ quarterfrom prec.''"-'
segment segment segment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
III 21—lI 23
First 4.29... 19.71... ... 35.45
Second —.66 — 46.57t+ (Unlike)48.39+ (Unlike)
Third 10.44t+ 43.82 — (Unlike)34.64 — (Unlike)
Fourth — 22.61 — Like 14.35 — Like
II24—Ill 26
First 2.14... 38.78t . ... 21.20
Second 2.32+ 19.25 — Unlike22.26+ Like
Third 1.35 — 25.12+ Unlike20.11 — Like
Fourt.h 3.16f+ 15.73 — Unlike13.80 — Unlike
IV27—IV28
First 2.23... 10.91... ... 11.48
Second —.08 — 11.48t+ (Unlike)10.47 — (Like)
Third 2.38 + 10.47 — (Unlike)10.02 — (Unlike)
Fourth6.15f+ 10.02 — (Unlike)30.86+ (Like)
III 31—Il 37
First 2.99... 1.28... ... 249
Second .74 — 4.03 + Unlike 3.86+ Unlike
Third 2.76+ 10.20+ Like 12.95+ Like
Fourth3.30t+ 21.38t+ Like 18.67+ Like
t Highest rate of growth, col. (1); highest orders, col. (3).
Parentheses indicate that, for reasons given in the text, the value of a comparison is
doubtful.
aDatesare trough and peak quarters in ton-miles.
b Computed from Babson estimates, 1877—1907, 1914—18; ARA data, 1908—13; ICC net
ton-miles, 1919—20; ICC revenue ton-miles, 1921—38.
Computed from Partington data, 1877—1923; Iron Trade Review data, 1924—38.
d No change in traffic.
This expansion lasted only three quarters and cannot be divided into more than three
segments without arbitrary allocation.
to grow, it does so less rapidly than before, the railroads will place
fewerorders. A mere retardation in therisein ton-miles should
iead to an acLual diuidiiution oI Contraction will affect
the equipment-producing industry before it appears in railway
traffic
Ifthe explanation of early declines in orders is re-
alistic, traffic, in t.hose ofexpansions in which purchases
minished before the end of the phase, must have grown most
Because of the time consumed in filling orders, however, employment and de-
liveries may continue to increase after new orders begin to wane.160 CHAPTER 6
rapidly at some time before its peak. Indeed its most rapid growth
must have accompanied or preceded the highest orders. To test
whether this was true of freight traffic, we divide each expansion
of ton-miles into four segments, compute the average rate of
growth and the average orders in each, and compare their changes
from segment to segment (Table 47, coT. 1 and 3; other columns,
not pertinent here, are explained laterbo).
10 Our plan for dividing a phase is explained in Chapter 7, where we encounter
a problem requiring the segmentation of contractions as well as expansions.
The proper method of determining the number of cars ordered corresponding
to the growth of traffic between any two successive stages is not obvious. It can be
explained with the aid of the following code of symbols.
Earlier stage Later stage
Month numbers, in chrono-
logical order 1,2, mm + 1, m + 2 •••m+ n
Traffic 81, t2, ... tn
No. of orders 01, P1, P2, pn
Cumulative orders, beginning
with first month of earlier
stage,oranypreceding
month c1, c2, Cmk1,k2
Our formula for computing the rate of growth of traffic is
nm
O.5(m + n)
The number of orders should be computed similarly. When two months are sepa-
rated by intervening months, the response, if any, to the growth of traffic is not to
be sought in the orders placed during the last month only, but in all the orders
placed after the first month. For example, the response to the change from si to t1
is notbut more properly 02 + 03 +++ p'. But this is equal to k1 —c1.
Likewise, the orders corresponding to the change in traffic between any two months
equal the cumulative orders for the later month minus the cumulative orders for
the earlier month. The orders corresponding to the average change in traffic from
the first group of months to the second group are
-
nin
and the rate of ordering corresponding to the rate of growth in traffic is
nm
0.5Cm + n)
Accordingly, we compute the orders corresponding to any segment of a traffic
phase by this formula. We dofollow either of two formulas that at first thought
might seem to be proper, viz;
or
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Table 48
Increase per Quarter in Passenger-miles; Passenger Cars Ordered per Quarter
During Segments of Expansions in Passenger-miles, 1908—1938
Cars ordered Cars ordered, lagged
Relation Relation
between between
MillionDirection No. of cars Directionsigns in col.No. of cars Directionsigns in col.
passenger. of change per of change(2) & (4) per of change(2) & (7)
miles per from prec. from prec. quarterfrom prec.
quartersegment segment segment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
II 08—Il 10
First 146 .. 327 ... . 599
Second 189 + 868 + Like 1,056+ Like
Third 155 — 957t+ Unlike 787 — Like
Fourth 211t+ 534 — Unlike 270 — Unlike
I 12—TV 13
First 139 550 .. ... 444 ..
Second 208t+ 597t + Like 652+ Like
Third 18 — 580 — Like 621 — Like
Fourth 58 + 597f + Like 303 — Unlike
IV 14—Il 18
First 153 .. 267 . ... 297
Second 156 + 377t + Like 382+ Like
Third 322 + 248 — (Unlike) 171 — (Unlike)
Fourth 484f+ 7 — (Unlike) 0 — (Unlike)
IV 18—11120
First 586f .. 0 ... ... 0
Second 188 — 55 + (Unlike) 176+ (Unlike)
Third —129 — 275 + (Unlike) 308 + (Unlike)
Fourth 417 + 294t + (Like) 173 — (Unlike)
I 22—TV 23
First 237t
. 700f ... 454
Second 222 621 Like 681 + Unlike
Third 129 454 Like 308 — Like
Fourth 107 368 Like 443 + Unlike
I 33—I 37
First 283 ... 39 ... ... 63
Second 55 — 54 + Unlike 42 — Like
Thirp 171 + 33 — Unlike 55 + Like
Fourth 284t+ 156t + Like 132 + Like
tHighestrate of traffic growth, col. (1); highest orders, col. (3).
Parentheses indicate that, for reasons givenin the text, the value of a comparison is
doubtful.
aDatesare trough and peakquarters in passenger-miles. The 1925 andthe 1928—29
expansionseach lasted only one quarter and cannot be divided into segments.
bComputedfrom Partington data, 1908—23; Railway Age data, 1933—37.
The results do not support the theory under consideration. In
all there were 8 phases in which the number of cars ordered per
quarter was greatest in some segment earlier than the fourth. In162 CHAPTER 6
exactly half of these phases (1904—07, 1921—23, 1924—26, 1927—28)
the most rapid growth of traffic followed the highest level of orders,
instead of coinciding with or preceding it. In the other four phases,
maximum purchases lagged behind maximum growth; but in one,
1877—84, an expansion that lasted more than seven years, the high-
est rate of increase in ton-miles pertains to the first segment; the
heaviest purchases did not occur until the third. Coming after so
long an interval, they can hardly be regarded as a deferred reaction
to the initial spurt in the movement of tonnage. A majority of the
8 observations are incompatible with the supposed explanation.
In the comparisons before 1908, it is true, we rely on the Babson
estimates of ton-miles. Although the latter were constructed with
great care and ingenuity, the materials on which they rest may
prevent them from accurately reflecting differences in rate of
growth.'1 But if we exclude the 5 earlier cycles from our count, we
get even less convincing results. Orders were at their highest be-
fore the end of the traffic expansion in 4 instances after 1908. In
three of these, maximum purchases preceded the most rapid
growth of ton-miles.
Orders for passenger cars attained their top level during an
earlier segment than the last in three expansions of passenger-
miles for which we have data on traffic (Table 48, col. 1 and 312).
Inanother, 1912—13, they were practically as high in the second as
in the final segment. Of these four phases, two support the theory.
Maximum orders either coincided with or came after the most
rapid increase of travel in 1912—13. Both came in the first segment
of 1922—23. But the other two, 1908—10 and 1914—18, contradict
the theory. War conditions, discussed previously, help explain
the premature decline in purchases.
From our consideration of both freight and passenger data we
conclude that fluctuations in the rate of growth of traffic did not
at all consistently account for early high levels of orders.
So far we have confined ourselves to asking whether an early
high level of orders, when it occurred, can be explained by a de-
celerating growth of traffic. But we can approach the subject from
the other end by inquiring in how many expansions of traffic did
Weuse them for 1914—18 also; but here they are founded on much more
data.
i2Averageorders computed from differences of cumulatives; see note 10.SUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 163
the highest rate of growth occur before the fourth segment? And
when it did, how often did maximum orders occur in the same seg-
ment as maximum growth, or somewhat later, but not in the last
segment? The quickest increase of ton-miles came before the last
segment in oniy 5 of the 13 expansions between 1877 and 1938. In
the remaining 8, tapering off cannot have reduced orders. In 2 of
the 5, it did not in fact reduce them. In 1921—23 maximum orders
preceded maximum growth; and the lag of orders in 1877—84, as
already noted, was too long to interpret in terms of traffic. Only
3 phases (1885—93, 1894—96, and 1911—13) fulfill both conditions
specified in our two questions.
If we omit phases before 1908, our general conclusion becomes
stronger. The most rapid growth came before the end in only one
expansion, 1921—23, and in that instance the highest level of orders
preceded it.
Rate of growth in general not linked with orders
Leaving behind us the particular question whether decelerations
in the increase of business to be handled account for the early
decline in orders, we may ask a more general question. Variations
in the growth of traffic, even when averaged over several months,
obviously do occur, although they are not consistent from cycle
to cycle. Are they matched by corresponding changes in orders?
Is an acceleration of growth from one segment to the next usually
accompanied by multiplying orders, and a deceleration by dimin-
ishing orders? To answer this question we have labeled each case
of more rapid growth in ton-miles plus, and each case of slackened
growth minus (see Table 47, col. 2). Likewise we marked each case
of increased freight car orders plus, and each case of diminished
orders minus (col. 4). If the answer to our question is 'yes', the
sign for traffic should agree with that for orders in a substantial
majority of cases. This it fails to do (Table 49, line 1, last two
columns). Of all comparisons from 1877 to date, the signs are alike
in only 15. In the other 21, of traffic was accompanied
by deceleration of orders, or vice versa.
But some of these comparisons should perhaps be regarded with
suspicion. Those for segments of expansions before 1908 involve
traffic estimates which, as previously noted, may not be equal to
the relatively delicate task of measuring changes in rate of growth.164 6
The data on orders, moreover, are very incomplete for the earliest
phases. But if we omit comparisons drawn the five earlier
phases, unlike signs are still a trifie more numerous than like
signs(line2). War conditions may account for the retardation of
orders in the third segment of 1914—18 and certainly account for
the high acceleration produced by the Director-General's 100,000
car order in the fourth. Prospective re-transfer of operations affects
the entire 1919—20 expansion. In 1921—25 ton-miles actually di-
minished in the second segment; in comparing the latter with the
first or third we are not doing strictly what we set out to do—in-
vestigate the changes in orders that correspond to different rates
of increase in traffic. Each segment of 1927—28 was only one quarter
long. But deletion of all these doubtful cases does not reveal any
striking majority among the few that remain (line 3); there are 8
instances of like, 6 of unlike changes.
Table 49
Car Orders and Rates of Traffic Growth
Number of Like and of Unlike Signs of Change
From first From secondFrom third
to second to third to fourth




11877—1938 5 7 4 9 6 5 15 21
21908—38 3 5 4 4 4 3 11 12
31908—38, omitting doubtful3 2 2 2 3 2 8 6
comparisots
41877—1938, orders lagged 5 7 8 5 5 6 18 18
51908—38, orders lagged 3 5 5 3 4 3 12 11





71908—38 4 2 2 4 4 2 10 8
81908—38, omitting doubtful4 1 2 2 3 1 9 4
comparisons
91908—38, orders lagged 4 2 4 2 1 5 9 9
101908—38,orderslagged,4 1 4 0 1 3 9 4
omittingdoubtful com-
parisons
Computed from Tables 47 and 48, col. (5) and (8).SUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 163
Similar comparisons for passenger traffic and orders fail to dis-
close any consistent relation (line 7). Ten times the signs are alike;
but 8 times they are unlike. Once more some of the comparisons
should perhaps be ignored. In the war expansion sharply falling
profits and transfer of operations may have disturbed the place-
ment of orders in the third and fourth segments. The first segment-
of19 18—20 falls within the period of government operation; traffic
declined during the third. When instances involving these seg-
ments are eliminated, the percentage of pairs of like signs rises
(line 8). In 9 cases the signs are alike, in oniy 4 unlike. Even so,
the number of like pairs against which unlike pairs cannot be
offset is only 5 out of 13, or 38 per cent.
Table 50
Freight Car Orders and Increase in Ton-miles
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Number of quarters, Stage III










quarters (line 6 + line 7) ÷ 2
9Av. change in ton-miles, or av.
orders, second segment, line 5
.32 13.09 14.04
÷ line 8
f Average of cumulatives; see text, note 10.
The foregoing computations were made on the assumption that
the response, if any, of management to a particular increase in
traffic begins in the first quarter of the rise and ends in the last.
But perhaps some little time elapses before railway officials
realize that a rise has begun, or before they can frame specifica-
tions and place contracts. With that possibility in mind we have
recomputed the average freight car orders, using data for stages166 CHAPTER 6
each of which begins and ends one quarter later than the cor-
responding stage of ton-miles. The new procedure, which allows
for an average lag of three months, is contrasted with the old in
Table 50. The new figures fail to support the view that orders are
positively related to growth (Table 49, last two columns, lines
4 to 6). If we review all comparisons from 1877 onward we find
unlike signs in exactly half. From 1908 to 1938 similar changes
exceeded dissimilar changes by a margin of only one. Omitting the
doubtful items in the later period leaves an equal division. Re-
computing passenger car orders in the same way, we get the same
number of like and unlike signs after 1908; when we exclude doubt-
ful comparisons, however, the 9 to 4 majority yielded by our
previous calculations remains.
These findings are based on some rather rough And in
the case of passenger car orders they do include a fair positive
score for selected comparisons. Nevertheless they should lead us
to reconsider the reasons for expecting a positive relation. If an
increase in traffic does ever lead to larger purchases, it must do so
because railway managers fear that the existing stock may soon
prove inadequate. Orders are of no value whatsoever in coping
with traffic already tendered; their usefulness lies in the future.
After they are filled, whatever transportation may then be called
for can more certainly and promptly be provided. If there are
times when the equipment on hand is considerably more than
adequate to the current volume of business, traffic can increase
materially without prompting any increase in orders. Our analysis
suggests strongly that there are such times. In contractions the
number of cars did not decline in proportion to traffic; sometimes,
indeed, it actually increased. It is fairly clear that near the be-
ginning of expansions the supply of vehicles, on most roads and
perhaps excepting specialized varieties, was commonly more than
sufficient. Quite possibly even the previous peak may not have
fully tested the capacity of the equipment then on hand.
While traffic is climbing toward, but is still quite far from, the
shadowy limit imposed by existing stocks, we should not expect
its growth to have any great effect on orders. If it does rise close
13Onthe inevitable limitations of the order figures see Chapter II of Partington's
book. We found them difficult to adjust for seasonality and feel uncertain of our
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to that level, on the other hand, we should not suppose that the
railroad companies will provide merely for a slight further incre-
ment, only to have the same problem come up again a few months
later. Frequent reconsideration would be time-consuming and
inconvenient. If borrowing were necessary,underwriters and
investors would not welcome a multiplicity of equipment trust
issues, each secured by a small block of rolling stock. No one
railroad typically buys cars in continuous driblets; or at any rate,
small repetitive purchases can hardly account for any large part
of total orders. On the contrary, orders for hundreds or thousands
of freight cars, depending on the size of the road, are often placed
at one time. On any one road, large increases in traffic may have
little effect on orders up to some critical point; then a relatively
small further increase may be accompanied by a burst of pur-
chases, after which orders may again fall to a low level. No doubt
this point is reached at different dates on different roads; in the
national totals, the effect may be distributed over a considerable
period. But it does not follow that the grand total of orders will be
closely related throughout expansion to the rate of growth. Little
response to growing traffic at first, then progressively increasing
response, then a tapering off as needs for some time in the future
are deemed to be provided for—this interpretation fits the pattern
of orders reasonably well, without presupposing any special
pattern in the growth of traffic.
Prospective traffic in uncertain quantities, rather than the
proximity of current volume to capacity, must often have stim-
ulated buying intended to increase the stock of equipment. In the
earlier expansions, extensive new mileage was under construction.
Until a new line is opened, those in charge of it have experienced
no growth of traffic at all; yet they must be ready to provide load-
ing when they begin to do business. The projection and construe-
Sd Sd S:. '4_I ....,-.S..,. '4
currentrate of growth on lines already in operation.
On the other hand, there is an alternative to increasing the
supply of equipment even when traffic is at a critical level. The
neeueu io nanwe anyspecuieu UJu ue-
pends on. the quality of service to be provided. A larger supply is
required to handle tonnage promptly than to handle it with some
delay. In a pinch the standard of service can be reduced. BetweenCHAPTER 6
1908, or perhaps some earlier time, and 1924, large freight car
shortages developed near peaks in ton-miles (Chart 7114). It
should not be inferred that many intended shipments were never
actually made. The figures show oniy that many cars were not
placed for loading on the day for which they were requested. Prob-
ably most of the shipments actually did move, but somewhat later
than the consignors desired. Of course, this was not a satisfactory
solution of the problem; but for a long while it was the one railroad
managers adopted, perhaps involuntarily.
CHART71












Shaded periods are contractions in ton—mtles.
No data, October 19M—January 1915, December 1917.
Anothermethod by which the supply of cars can sometimes be
stretched is to increase the amount of empty movement. While
shortages threaten on some parts of a line there are often surpluses
on others. If management is willing to haul empties from remote
points, increasing its transportation costs in the process, it can
raise the effective capacity of its equipment.
Sourcesof data: May 1907—Nov. 1916, American Railway Association, Bulletin
6, Feb. 6, 1917. Dec. 1916—Nov. 1917, C. 0. Ruggles, Railway Service and Regula-
tion, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, 1919, p. 129. Jan. 1918—Dec. 1921,
American Railway Association, Annual Bulletin, 1922. Jan. 1922—Dec. 1930,SUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 169
Many factors other than current or prospective traffic can, of
course, influence purchases. Among them are the prices equipment
builders ask, what they are likely to ask in the future, the antiquity
of the existing stock, the evolution of more economical types or
of vehicles better adapted to the needs of shippers, the intensity
of competition in service among railroads or with other means of
transport, and the financial condition of the
MAINTENANCE DEFERRED IN CONTRACTION
The unserviceable portion of the equipment supply tended to
grow when traffic was falling off and to diminish when traffic was
rising. This is clearest in the case of freight cars (Chart 72). Some
months after each peak in traffic, cars in bad order, which had been
decreasing in number, began to accumulate and continued to do
so throughout the remainder of the contraction and part way into
the next expansion. At some time after the trough, the number
began to decline and continued to do so until the next peak of
traffic had been passed. In the three last phases, in which the
amplitude of fluctuation in traffic was more severe than anything
since 1921, the unserviceable stock of locomotives, both freight
and passenger, also behaved in this manner (Charts 73 and 74).
Before that, however, similar variations are difficult or impossible
Survey of Current Business. No data for Oct. 1914—Jan. 1915, Dec. 1917. Shortages
after 1924 were small and are not shown.
The following general description of the figures is suggested by the instructions
on the back of Association of American Railroads (new name), Car Service Divi-
sion, Form CS-44, Revised 1—1—36. On each railway operating division, cars avail-
able at the close of a business day for loading the next day are compared with
cars ordered for loading the next day (orders too large for shippers' loading capac-
ity are adjusted downward). Excess of available over ordered is reported to central
office of railway as surplus; excess of ordered over available as shortage. Each
railway system separately the figures from its divisions reporting
and those from divisions reporting shortages Daily system totals of each kind
agesand surpluses, therefore, can be and frequently are reported simultaneously.
To estimate daily averages for monthly periods we combined daily averages
for bi-weekiy periods, 1907—12, or for semi-monthly periods, 113—14, and averaged
figures for one day at the beginning and one at the end of each month
o, are averagesonly tao last / orta-csa
month.
ArthurF. Burns is conducting a comprehensive National Bureau study of cy-
clical variations in the construction of plant and equipment on the railroads and
in other industries.170 CHAPTER 6
to The shopmen's strike in the summer of 1922 caused a
sudden piling up of unusable motive power, which was liquidated,
somewhat less rapidly, in the following months. Apart from this
disturbance, the stock in bad order declined fairly continuously
from the beginning of 1921 to late 1929 or early 1930.16 But in the
case of locomotives assigned to passenger service the decline pro-
ceed?d more rapidly in expansions (Table 51). There was unbroken
inverse conformity to travel. The story for locomotives intended
for freight service when repaired is less consistent. Five com-
parisons of phases indicate inverse, but three positive conformity.17
The average decline per month was greater in 1923—24 than in
1921—23 or 1924—26. In 1926—27 the companies reduced the un-
serviceable stock at the rate of about 20 locomotives per month;
in 1927—29, only 5.4. Computation of the average net change, how-
ever, hardly gives us a fair indication of what went on in 1921—23 or
1923—24, since the rate altered sharply within each phase. If the
strike had not occurred, it seems likely that the mechanical depart-
ments of the roads, which had already begun to work down the
bad-order supply, would have persisted in that course, that the
number would have been much smaller at the end of the expan-
sion, and that it might have increased in the following contraction.
(Actually there was a sharp fall in the first part of that contraction
but a slight rise during the remainder and for a few months after.)
There would have been a fall in 1921—23 and a rise in 1923—24, and
there would have been a similar contrast between 1923—24 and
1925—26. The oniy other exceptional comparison involves the
mildest contraction and expansion in the period for which we have
data. In such phases the effect of cyclical fluctuation in traffic can
most readily be obscured by accidental circumstances.
Variations in an unserviceable stock are the net result of two
opposite sets of influences. On the one hand, wear and tear in use
is constantly making some units of equipment unusable. On the
other, the railroadsconstantly removing some units from the
unserviceable group either by repairing them or by writing them
off the books. During a month in which the number of units be-
coming disabled exceeds the number repaired or retired, the un-
16Thereare no comparable data for 1920 because some roads failed to report.
Nocomparison of 1920—21 with the following phase can be made; we cannot tell
what the nature of the change indicated by complete figures for 1920 would have•
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serviceable stock increases. When repairs and retirements exceed
disablements, it diminishes.
Since the stock increased, after the first few months, in 1929—32
(or 1929—33 in passenger service) and in 1937—38, the amount of
equipment rendered unserviceable must have exceeded the amount
repaired or retired. This means that it exceeded the amount re-
paired alone. The railroads did not recondition equipment as fast
as it became unusable. Instead they allowed unserviceable stocks
to accumulate.
CHART 72











Shadedperiods are contractions in ton—miles.
Maintenancework must have been reduced considerably. Pre-
sumably the number of vehicles becoming 'bad order' each month
diminishes as the amount of use diminishes during a contraction
of traffic. Consequently repairs could be reduced somewhat with-
out any accumulation. But in practice maintenance of equipment
was reduced even more, since cars and locomotives in disrepair
actually did accumulate.
There are several reasons why railroad managers should fail,
during a contraction, to maintain the stock of serviceable equip-
ment at its previous peak level. Cutting maintenance expense
improves the immediate financial showing of the company. Operat-
ing profits tend to decline out of proportion to traffic anyhow, as
we shall demonstrate in Chapter 10. The showing would be still
worse if the sum required to maintain the stock at its initial levelCHART 73










Shaded periods ore contractions in ton—miles.
1920 incomplete. See Chart 66.
CHART 74
Unserviceable Locomotives Assigned to Road Passenger Service, January 1921—
December 1941






















Level of passenger-miles TroughPeak TroughPeakTroughPeakTroughPeak Trough
Months from preceding date .. 20 18 4 40 3 48 48 17
Number of unserviceable locomotivest 3,345 2,669 2,606 2,547 2,073 2,019 2,859 1,687 1,929
'Change from preceding date
Total
Per month
To peak from trough





























Unserviceable Locomotives assigned to Road Passenger Service








f Three-month average; date of turn is middle month.174 CHAPTER6
were charged to operating expenses. Probably, however, this is
not the main consideration; by itself it might be a little short-
sighted. The companies may also feel uncertain whether the peak
stock will again be needed. As the contraction of 1929—32 de-
velopecj, and as the inroads of motor competition became more and
more obvious, many railroad officials must have doubted that
their traffic would ever regain its 1929 level. Meanwhile improve-
ments in what new equipment was being purchased as well as in
the layout of fixed plant and in operating practices made it some-
what unlikely that a stock as large as before would be required
even for a completely restored volume of traffic. It would be
foolish to spend money on repairing cars and locomotives that
might never be utilized; better to leave untouched the poorest
part of the disabled stock—the part most likely to be discarded
if the total supply should ultimately prove excessive. Then, too,
designers may evolve better types before the next boom; delay
may permit a wiser choice between buying new vehicles and re-
conditioning old ones. Moreover, even if managers could be certain
that all the old rolling stock would come in handy, interest on the
cost of repairs would be lost by making them too far in advance of
need. Finally, as is apparent from preceding chapters, it is possible
to neglect repairs to some extent when traffic is declining, and yet
preserve a serviceable supply large enough to accommodate the
current traffic with ease. Although unusable vehicles multiplied
and the serviceable number declined in 1929—32 (or —33) and 1937—
38, traffic declined even more rapidly than the usable supply, and
the average serviceable vehicle was not required to do as much
work at the end of the phase as at the beginning.
If there are good reasons for not offsetting disablements by
repair, there are also good reasons for not offsetting them by re-
tirement. Although in a contraction like 1929—32 the suspicion may
arise that lost volume will not be recovered, nothing is certain.
In case it should come back in large measure it will be convenient
to have a reserve that can fairly quickly be added to the active
supply by reconditioning rather than purchase. Only the eventual
recovery, great or small, will tell with some finality how much of
the disabled stock will be needed. Apparently this possibility, in
these two instances, outweighed the immediate scrap value and
the cost of storing equipment in bad order.SUPPLY AND CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 175
As expansion develops, on the other hand, it becomes more
obvious either that an increase in the serviceable stock by means of
repairs will soon be needed or that much of the equipment has no
future and retiring it is preferable to expenditure on recondition-
ing. Consequently, the unserviceable stock is likely to be reduced
in the one way or the other, even though gross additions to it are
presumably increasing as a result of greater wear and tear in the
growing movement of traffic. In 1932—37 (or 1933—37) retirement
in fact played an important role, for the serviceable supply also
decreased. Change in that supply is the net result of acquisitions
of new cars and repairs of old ones, on the one hand, and disable-.
ments, plus perhaps retirement of cars not first transferred to the
unserviceable group, on the other. Obviously the latter two items
exceeded the former. Disablements (plus any retirements made
without first transferring the vehicles to the bad order category)
were more numerous than repairs and new acquisitions, and hence
than repairs alone.
That the rises in bad orders did not begin promptly at the re-
cession in traffic, nor the reductions promptly at its revival, may
be accounted for by a combination of three factors. When traffic
turns upward, the number of units becoming unserviceable must
begin to increase. But railroad managers may not promptly realize
that there has been an upturn. What we designate in retrospect as
a trough or a peak may not have been recognized at the time.
Consequently, increased repairs will not necessarily be ordered
when expansion begins, especially since in spite of past reductions
the margin of serviceable equipment is very comfortable at the
trough. Finally, it takes some time for repairs to be completed.
For several months after the upturn deliveries from repair shops
may continue to reflect the previous downward trend in traffic.
Since disablements are increasing and completions of repairs are
not promptly increasing but perhaps diminishing, the unservice-
able stock continues to rise. Conversely, when a peak in traffic is
reached, the new repairs authorized may remain high, deliveries
of repairs formerly authorized may continue to increase for some
time, reflecting the previous upward trend in traffic, while the
number of vehicles disabled will begin to fall. For a while repairs
will exceed disablements and the unserviceable stock will continue
to dwindle.